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administrative supervision over local governmental functions in other
areas." A system of state administrative supervision and control" would
avoid many of the inadequacies of the present system of control, provid-
ing the desirable element of flexibility and at the same time protecting
the higher interest of the state in seeing that local governments conform
to the highest possible standards of efficiency.
The identity of local governments with the people must be preserved.
The growing interdependence of communities economically and the cost-
liness of services and functions demanded by citizens of local governments
serve to illustrate also the broader responsibility of the state in protecting
the welfare of its citizens. It is submitted that an amendment granting
procedural powers will do much to relieve many of the problems arising
as a result of the present system of control over the form and internal
organization of cities and towns. The problems of state-local relations
can best be solved, however, by creating an administrative board invested
with the authority for a continuous determination of the proper functions
of local governments. The ultimate solution depends, in a large measure,
on an enlightened, voluntary cooperation between local authorities and
state administrative agencies.
A CONSIDERATION OF THE PROBLEMS IN
CONSORTIUM RECOVERY
From judicial decisions, scholarly texts, and journal writings a pres-
sure is being generated leaving the law of consortium in unrest.' The
impetus for this pressure is easily discernable in a typical situation in-
67. Administrative control is most pronounced in the areas of finance, education,
highways, public health and social welfare. But no state has developed a systematic ba-
sis for administrative controls, encompassing all the major functions of government.
See SCHULZ, AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT 148 (1949).
68. Two principal plans of administrative control have been used. One involves
concentrating within a single state agency control over the various municipal functions.
The plan followed in the United States is characterized by the distribution of control
among existing administrative agencies. Id. at 149.
1. A recent leading case allowing a wife to recover for negligent invasion of con-
sortium rights is Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Two jurisdic-
tions have followed this judicial innovation. Brown v. Georgia Tennessee Coaches Inc.,
88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953) ; Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb.
1953). For a discussion of the various aspects of consortium favoring the view of grant-
ing recovery to the wife see, HARPER, TORTS 566 (1933) ; PROSSER, TORTS 948 (1941) ;
Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MIcH. L. REv. 1 (1923); Lipp-
man, The Breakdozwn of Consortium, 30 COL. L. REv. 651 (1930) ; Notes, 9 IND. LJ. 182
(1933), 5 CORNELL L.Q. 171 (1920), 39 CORNELL L.Q. 761 (1954), 35 Ky. L.J. 220
(1947) ; 39 MIcH. L. REV. 820 (1940), 23 U. OF CiN. L. REV. 108 (1954).
NOTES
volving consortium loss. A man, injured negligently, recovers compen-
sation for his bodily injury. His ability to perform any domestic duties
is temporarily or permanently impaired. The frequently unrealistic
compensation that he may recover for loss of earning power will indirectly
inure to his family as a whole, but the individual harm each member of
his domestic group suffers is an independent, personal loss.
Consortium signifies the legal rights characterized as services, so-
ciety, sexual intercourse, and conjugal affection of the spouse.' Fre-
quently inexact usage leaves the concept of consortium without fixed
limits. In general an invasion of the consortium interest involves two
elements: pecuniary loss, which refers primarily to services; and senti-
mental loss, including loss of society, affection, and chastity.' The
former is economic injury affecting the pocket book, and the latter, often
called solatium, is injury to the feelings.
One problem typical to all investigations of the marital relation is
the fiction of the legal identity of husband and wife that was integrated
into the early common law forms of action." The status of the woman
in the society of the sixteenth and seventeenth century guided the develop-
ment of the court's attitude toward relational marital interests.
In the seventeenth century the wife was considered for, many pur-
poses a chattel of the husband; he was entitled to her services and society.5
At first the usually recognized forms of interference with a husband's in-
terest in his wife were abduction, criminal conversation, and assault and
battery, all of which were intentional wrongs giving the husband a right
to recover.6 Later, to meet the changing social needs, new causes of action
were developed giving him remedies for injury to his wife due to libel and
slander, malicious prosecution, sale to her of habit forming drugs, and
malpractice.7
Under the prevailing attitudes at early common law the wife was not
2. PRossER, TORTS 917 (1941).
3. Holbrook, supra note 1, esp. at 2.
4. At common law the legal existence of the woman was suspended or merged in
that of the husband. 1 BL., CoMM. 442; Co. LITT. 112; 2 KErT CoMM. 129.
5. "[I]f the beating or other mal-treatment be very enormous, so that thereby the
husband is deprived for any time of the company and assistance of his wife, the law then
gives him a separate remedy by an action of trespass, in nature of an action upon the case,
for this ill usage, per quod consortium amisit; in which he shall recover a satisfaction in
damages." 3 BL., Commit. 140.
6. See 3 BL., Commts. 140.
7. Indiana recognizes an action by the husband for his damages arising from inten-
tional injuries to the wife, including enticement, Higham v. Vanosdol, 101 Ind. 160
(1855) ; alienation of affection, Van Vacter v. McKillip, 7 Blackf. 578 (Ind. 1845);
malicious prosecution, Rogers v. Smith, 17 Ind. 323 (1861) ; and libel, Hart v. Crow, 7
Blackf. 351 (Ind. 1845). See, MADDEN, PERSONS AND DOmESTIc RELATIONS 161, n.75
(1931).
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sui juris and could not sue for loss of the services of the husband.8 In
recognition of the changed social status of woman, legislatures passed
Women's Emancipation Acts removing their disability to sue.' Since
then the wife has come to be allowed protection similar to that of the
husband's for loss of consortium resulting from an intentional inter-
ference."0
In recognizing the rights of the wife to damages for the intentional
injuries to consortium the courts tend toward the theory that this recovery
exists as a mutual right flowing from the marital relationship rather than
as an exclusive right of the husband. The right is founded not upon any
master-servant principle but upon legally protected interests inherent in
the conjugal relation.11 The recoverable damages include not only the
pecuniary items, 2 but also the sentimental elements.1"
8. One authority indicates: "One very good reason [that the wife was denied re-
covery at common law] was that she had not the capacity to maintain an action of her
own against anyone .... ." PROSSER, TORTS 927 (1941). An attempt to overcome this
limitation by joining the husband in the action failed. See Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L. Cas.
577, 11 Eng. Reprint 854 (1861).
Blackstone, in explaining the absence of the wife's rights in the matter of relative
injuries suggests "[olne reason for which may be this: that the inferior hath no kind of
property in the company, care, or assistance of the superior . . . and therefore the in-
ferior can suffer no loss or injury." 3 BL. COMM., op. cit. supra note 6, at 143. This
speculative comment is clearly the result of a groping for a rationale upon which to base
the action by a spouse. At best it is an explanation of the existing society during that
period when the status of a wife was comparable to that of a servant.
9. See MADDEN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 159 n.71; IND. ANN. STAT. § 38-101 et seq.
(Burns 1949).
10. Haynes v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581, 29 N.E. 389 (1891) (enticement) ; Holmes v.
Holmes, 133 Ind. 386, 32 N.E. 932 (1893) (alienation of affection).
Some courts point out that recovery is not granted to the wife where there is no
direct injury to the marital relation. PROSSER, TORTS 947 (1941). One case indicates that
because the malice in an intentional act to have the husband arrested was not in fact
directed toward the wife's interests, she could not recover. Nieberg v. Cohen, 88 Vt. 281,
289, 92 Atl. 214, 218 (1914). Another interpretation of direct injury indicates that where
there is no intentional tort the ordinary rule of damages goes no further than to com-
pensate for injury directly done. Feneff v. New York Central & H.R.R., 203 Mass.
278, 281, 89 N.E. 436, 437 (1909). Following the Feneff concept the Connecticut court
in Marri v. Stamford St. R.R., 84 Conn. 9, 18, 78 Atl. 582, 585 (1911) declares "[lioss
or impairment of conjugal affection is certainly not a natural result of physical injuries
suffered by one of the parties to a marital union."
11. The court in describing this inherent interest states: "If there is any such thing
as legal truth and legal right, a wronged wife may have her action in such a case as this,
for in all the long category of human rights there is no clearer right than that of the
wife to her husband's support, society, and affection. An invasion of that right is a fla-
grant wrong, and it would be a stinging and bitter reproach to the law if there were no
remedy." (emphasis added) Haynes v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581, 582, 29 N.E. 389 (1891).
The right to each other's society and comfort is reciprocal. Gregg v. Gregg, 37 Ind.
App. 210, 75 N.E. 674 (1905). See MADDEN, op. cit. supra note 7 at 173.
12. Pecuniary loss is not necessary. In describing the action one Indiana case states:
"[tlhe action is not regarded in the nature of an action by a master for the loss of the
services of his servant, and it is not necessary that there be any pecuniary loss whatever."
Adams v. Main, 3 Ind. App. 232, 235, 29 N.E. 792, 793 (1892). For a collection of author-
NOTES
Generally, the spouses are accorded nearly 4 equal treatment in the
protection of their conjugal rights where their interests are invaded by
willful conduct.1" This is not the rule, however, where the injuries are
occasioned by negligence. 6 With the growth of the law of negligence
there was early recognition of the husband's right to recover for negligent
harm to his conjugal interests.' Until 1950, the wife's recovery for loss
of consortium due to another's negligent conduct was almost uniformly
denied.'" Dicta in a recent case indicates that this is the law in Indiana. 9
ity supporting this view see MADDEN, op. cit. supra note 7 at 167.
13. For a discussion of the measure of damages involved where a husband is suing
for loss of consortium see Selleck v. Janesville, 104 Wis. 570, 80 N.W. 944 (1899) ; In-
dianapolis, & M. R. Transit Co. v. Reeder, 51 Ind. App. 533, 100 N.E. 101 (1912) ; Rogers
v. Smith, 17 Ind. 323 (1861).
14. See note 10 supra.
15. "Heart Balm" statutes, have abolished the remedy of damages for seduction,
breach of promise to marry, alienation of affection, and criminal conversation. INn.
ANN. STAT. § 2-508 (Burns 1946). It cannot reasonably be supposed that the legislature
by this act meant that consortium in its general sense should not be protected. For a
discussion of the Indiana statute see Feinsinger, Legislative Attack on "Heart Balm," 33
MICH. L. REv. 979, 998 (1935). This legislation was prompted by fear of judicial mis-
employment by the unscrupulous, who, by threats of unsavory proceedings, might be able
to obtain large settlements regardless of the guilt or innocence of the accused party.
Only a minority of jurisdictions have enacted Heart Balm statutes, and those statutes
passed serve to abolish only actions specifically prescribed and nothing more. For a
discussion of the constitutionality of Heart Balm statutes abolishing the common law
remedies see Note, 22 IND. L.J. 186 (1947).
16. "Our court is agreed that when a wife is tortiously injured by another either
negligently or designedly, the husband has an independent right of action against the
tort-feasor, for his loss of the services, society, companionship and all that is contained
in the word 'consortium' of the wife, resulting from such injury." Burk v. Anderson,
232 Ind. 77, 80, 109 N.E. 2d 407, 407 (1952). See PROSSER, ToRTs § 102 (1941) ; MAD-
DEN, supra note 7, at 161. However, the wife is not allowed recovery where consortium
loss is occasioned by negligence. Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912).
For a collection of authority denying the wife recovery see Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.,
183 F.2d 811, 812 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1950); PROSSER, ToRTs 946 (1941).
17. Negligence evolved as a separate action about 1825. PROSSER, ToRTs 171 (1941).
Actions by a husband for negligent injury to his wife resulting in loss of consortium
were recognized shortly thereafter. Id. at 939.
18. One decision did allow a wife recovery, Hipp v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours &
Co., 182 N.C. 9, 108 S.E. 318 (1921), but was later overruled. Hinnant v. Tidewater
Power Co., 189 N.C. 120, 126 S.E. 307 (1925).
19. Indiana has denied the wife's right to recover for loss of consortium due to
negligence. Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912). In a recent case the
court failed to cite this precedent in an action by a wife. While the decision concerned
consortium loss, the wrongful act that caused the loss also caused the immediate death
of the husband. Since the courts have ruled that recovery for consortium loss is
limited to the time between the injury and death, there could be no recovery in this case.
See infra p. 283. Concerning consortium recovery by a wife the judge stated: "It is the
belief of the writer of this opinion that when a husband is tortiously injured by another
either negligently or designedly the wife, under our enabling statutes, has an independent
right of action against the tort-feasor, for her loss of support, society and maintenance
of the husband, resulting from such injuries. . . . Notwithstanding the weight of
authority to the contrary I think this should be the law. . . . However, a majority does
not agree with this idea." Burk v. Anderson, 232 Ind. 77, 80, 109 N.E.2d 407, 408 (1952).
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It is difficult to justify this unequal treatment in view of the enhanced
social status of women and the prior recognition of mutual rights for
intentional injuries.
In 1950, in Hittaffer v. Argonne Co.,2" the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia handed down a most persuasive
opinion allowing the wife to recover for loss of consortium due to negli-
gent conduct. Since this decision, however, the courts of all but two of
the jurisdictions deciding the same question have rejected the Hitaffer
logic, and in so doing have refused to follow the view urged by various
legal scholars and writers.2'
Realizing the problem of justifying this disparity of treatment some
courts have gone so far as to deny the husband his traditional cause of
action for negligent invasion of marital interest.22 This result is reached
by relating the husband's action to one by a master for loss of services
of a servant 2 and, reasoning from this that, since the increased social
status of women did away with the master-servant concept, justification
for allowing the husband to recover no longer exists. Perhaps it is true
that originally the theory of the action for loss of consortium was loss of
services, but it is clear that the modern view of recovery is not grounded
on the same theory.24 While conjugal benefits to a husband include
services that might be furnished by hired servants, they also involve
services that the wife alone can render.25 Damages are allowed for the
sentimental elements which are clearly not a part of the master-servant
concept. The use of a restricted interpretation of consortium to justify
denial of recovery to the husband is as arbitrary as granting recovery to
one spouse and not the other.
20. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
21. See note 1 supra.
22. Marri v. Stamford St. R.R., 84 Conn. 9, 78 Atl. 582 (1911) ; Whitcomb v. New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 215 Mass. 440, 102 N.E. 663 (1913) ; Blair v. Steiner Dry Goods
Co., 184 Mich. 304, 151 N.W. 724 (1915); Golden v. R.L. Greene Paper Co., 44 R.I. 231,
116 Atl. 579 (1922) ; But cf. Bolger v. Boston Elevated Ry., 205 Mass. 420, 91 N.E. 389
(1910) recovery allowed for actual medical expenses only.
23. The courts discount the seemingly clear language-loss of society, chastity and
other sentimental elements-which appear in pleadings in the early actions claiming loss
of consortium because of the recognized history of verbiage and redundancy in common
law pleading. See Lippman, supra note 1, at 668.
24. The modern view of recovery includes both sentimental and pecuniary elements.
Citizens St. Ry. v. Twiname, 121 Ind. 375, 23 N.E. 159 (1890); Indianapolis & M.R.
Transit Co. v. Reeder, 51 Ind. App. 533, 100 N.E. 101 (1912) ; See also Selleck v. Janes-
ville, 104 Wis. 570, 80 N.W. 944 (1899).
25. The Indiana Appellate Court has admitted extensive evidence of both pecuniary
and sentimental loss in a negligence action by a husband. One element for example was
the loss of the wife's talent for music in the home that added to its attractiveness since
her efforts in this regard were a source of comfort, enjoyment, and happiness to the
husband. Indianapolis, & M.R. Transit Co. v. Reeder, supra note 24.
NOTES
Reasoning along lines created in the law by the status of the wife in
the seventeenth century other courts combine various rationales to main-
tain the inequality by denying only the wife recovery for loss of con-
sortium due to negligent conduct.2"
Often the action by the husband is narrowly defined as one by a
master for loss of services. The wife, thought of as a mere servant, has
no legal claim to the master's services." This argument fails to recognize
that recovery by the husband is not limited to services and also that since
the Emancipation Acts the master-servant analogy is no longer ap-
plicable to the wife.
Some opinions insist that the wife had no claim at common law, and
that the later removal of the wife's disability did not create new rights.28
Historically there is a conflict as to whether the right did not exist or
whether it existed but that the wife lacked the capacity to sue." In either
event the common law argument does not justify denial of the wife's
recovery. The lack of precedent for an action does not mean that the in-
terests involved are not worthy of protection. The wife's interests have
been recognized where intentional injury is concerned, and the harm
involved where the injury is incurred by negligence is no less real. An-
other argument is that the damage to the wife is too remote and inconse-
quential.2" It is not clear how this reasoning can be applied to the wife's
26. Despite the strong language used by the Indiana ;ourt in recognizing the wife's
independent action for willful invasion of consortium in Hhynes v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581,
29 N.E. 389 (1891) this inequality of treatment for negligent loss of consortium was
upheld in Boden v. Del Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933) ; Brown v. Kistle-
man, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912). See Burk v. Anderson 232 Ind. 77, 109 N.E.2d
407 (1952).
27. The traditional action of the husband is characterized as one for only the pe-
cuniary loss embodied in the action for services. The court refuses to recognize that the
husband had legal rights enforceable separately for the sentimental elements of con-
sortium. This makes the action identical to one by a" master for injury to a servant.
Stout v. Kansas City Term. Ry., 172 Mo. App. 113, 121, 157 S.W. 1019, 1022 (1915).
28. Sobolewski v. German, 32 Del. 540, 127 Atl. 49 (1924) ; Cravens v. Louisville &
N.R.R., 195 Ky. 257, 242 S.W. 628 (1922); Emerson v. Taylor, 133 Md. 192, 104 Atl.
538 (1918) ; Nash v. Mobile & O.R.R., 149 Miss. 823, 116 So. 100 (1928) ; Bernhardt v.
Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462 (1919); Howard v. Verdigris Valley Elec. Co-op.,
201 Okla. 504, 207 P.2d 784 (1949); Sheard v. Oregon Electric Ry., 137 Ore. 341, 2 P.2d
916 (1931).
29. In an English case Lord Campbell argues that the wife has the right but lacks
the legal capacity to enforce it. See Lynch v. Knight, 9 H.L.Cas. 577, 11 Eng. Reprint
854 (1861).
30. See Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1945); Oppenheim v. Kridel,
236 N.Y. 156, 140 N.E. 227 (1923).
31. Brown v. Kistleman, 177 Ind. 692, 98 N.E. 631 (1912) ; Feneff v. New York
Central & H.R.R., 203 Mass. 278, 89 N.E. 436 (1909) ; Kosciolek v. Portland Ry. Light
Power Co., 81 Ore. 517, 160 Pac. 132 (1916).
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and not the husband's cause of action for loss of rights of consortium. -
Several jurisdictions deny recovery on the ground that the husband
is compensated in his own action for the loss of his earnings which are the
source of the wife's support and that any recovery by the wife for the
same injury would amount to double recovery." It is true that, where
loss of support has been compensated in a previous judgment, the wife
has no further claim from the tort-feasor for her pecuniary loss." How-
ever, invasion of consortium is independent of the invasion of personal
bodily security and has been shown to involve more than pecuniary ele-
ments of damage. 5 Recovery by the husband in an action for his personal
injuries should not bar consortium recovery by the wife for the simul-
taneous, direct, and independent harm she suffers. The fact that some
of the pecuniary elements of the wife's consortium action may have been
redressed-perhaps only partially-in a previous suit by another is no
justification for denying compensation for the remainder of the harm
she has sustained.
Probably the real reason for denying the wife recovery for loss of
consortium in an action for negligence is precedent. In view of historical
and judicial precedent, right or wrong, courts are led to declare that any
change should be made by the legislature."6 While legislation has not
dealt with this matter directly, the trend is to make the wife and the
husband social equals. 7 It would seem that the judiciary need not wait
32. Concerning those jurisdictions which state negligence theory in causation terms,
the tortfeasor's act is clearly the cause in fact of damage to the consortium interest im-
paired. Where the risk theory applies it would seem logical to argue that since the
husband was a person within the risk of harm when the woman is injured, conversely the
wife would be a person within the risk of harm where a man is injured. See Note, 29
IND. L.J. 622 (1954).
33. Giggey v. Gallagher Transp. Co., 101 Colo. 258, 72 P.2d 1100 (1937) ; Gearing
v. Berkson, 223 Mass. 257, 111 N.E. 785 (1916) ; Eschenbach v. Benjamin, 195 Minn. 378,
263 N.W. 154 (1935); Bernhardt v. Perry, 276 Mo. 612, 208 S.W. 462 (1919); Helm-
stetler v. Duke Power Co., 224 N.C. 821, 32 S.E.2d 611 (1945) ; Tobiassen v. Polley, 96
N.J. 66, 114 Atl. 153 (1921) ; Goldman v. Cohen, 30 Misc. 336, 63 N.Y. Supp. 459 (1900).
34. In Indiana a husband is required by statute to furnish support for his wife.
IND. ANN. STAT. § 38-116 (Burns 1949). Where a tortfeasor has compensated the hus-
band for his loss of earning power, the wife's pecuniary recovery is limited to the statu-
tory action against her husband for the portion to which she is entitled.
35. The independent existence of recovery for sentimental damage is indicated
where a husband has been allowed an action for criminal conversation though living apart
from his wife. Michael v. Dunkle, 84 Ind. 544 (1882) ; Pierce v. Crisp, 260 Ky. 519, 86
S.W.2d 293 (1935) ; Cross v. Grant, 62 N.H. 675 (1883).
36. In the language of one court: "The subject of woman's rights and torts has
been so frequently before the Legislature, and the common laws relative thereto have
been so frequently modified, that we must assume that those remnants of the common
law not changed have met with general approval." Ripley v. Ewell, 61 So.2d 420, 421
(Fla. 1952). See also Franzed v. Zimmerman, 127 Colo. 381, 256 P.2d 897 (1953).
37. Buchanan, The Legal Status of Women It the United States of America (1941)
Dept. of Labor, Women's Bureau, Bulletin No. 157.
NOTES
for legislation to correct judicially created inconsistencies founded upon
outmoded concepts.3"
In addition to the unequal treatment for the wife's consortium re-
covery, there are other chronic problems that pervade the entire field of
relational torts. The courts falter in theory where they fail to treat the
spouses consortium action independently and erroneously employ bars of
limitations applicable only to the action by the victim.
Under Anglo-American common law a right of action for personal
injury did not survive the victim's death, and no civil action accrued to
anyone on account of his death; but this rule has been generally modified
by statutes. 9 Recovery is limited under those statutes to only the pe-
cuniary loss suffered by those for whose benefit the action may be
maintained."
Not considering relational torts the common law rule as modified by
survival statutes limiting recovery for personal injury damages to the
lifetime of the injured party seems rational.4 ' However, application of
38. "When the reason for any rule of law ceased, the rule should be discarded."
Randolph v. Randolph, 146 Fla. 491, 495, 1 So.2d 480, 481 (1941) ; "We act in the finest
common-law tradition when we adapt and alter decisional law to produce common-sense
justice." Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 355, 102 N.E.2d 691, 694 (1951). In Cooney v.
Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D. Neb. 1953), a Federal District Court in Nebraska, a
jurisdiction without precedent for such an action, determined without difficulty that the
action would lie in favor of the wife where her consortium interests are invaded by the
negligence of a third person.
39. Indianapolis, P. & C. R.R. v. Keely's Adm., 23 Ind. 133 (1864); Baker v. Bolton,
1 Campb. 493, 170 Eng. Reprint 1033 (1808) ; Schumacher, Rights of Action under Death
and Survival Statutes, 23 MIcH. L. REv. 114 (1924) ; Oppenheim, The Survival of Tort
Actions and the Action for Wrongful Death-A Survey and a Proposal, 16 TULANE L.
Rv. 386 (1942) ; Voss, The Recovery of Damages for Wrongful Death at Common Law,
at Civil Law, and in Louisiana, 6 TULANE L. REv. 201, 203-212 (1932); Note, Proposed
Acts Concerning Wrongful Death and Survival of Actions in Indiana, 26 IND. L.J. 428
(1951). See IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-404 (Burns 1951).
40. The Indiana act provides, ". . . the provisions of this act, shall inure to the ex-
clusive benefit of the widow or widower, as the case may be, and to the dependent chil-
dren, if any, or dependent next of kind...." [emphasis added] IND. ANN. STAT. § 2-404
(Burns 1946). "The damages are not to be estimated at the value of the life lost, but at
such a sum as will compensate the persons on whose behalf the action is brought for the
pecuniary injury which they have sustained by the death." Consolidated Stone Co. v.
Staggs, 164 Ind. 331, 337, 73 N.E. 695, 697 (1905).
41. It might be pointed out that survival statutes are not involved in consideration
of consortium recovery in that they would only apply to actions individual in the deceased
person surviving for the benefit of the estate. The individual consortium recovery by
the surviving spouse is not an action that could have been brought by the deceased
spouse.
Some jurisdictions have interpreted the Women's Emancipation Statutes as shifting
the cause of action for loss of services from the husband to the wife for her personal
bodily injury. However, she cannot recover for sentimental loss. See Ford Motor Co. v.
Mahone, 205 F.2d 267 (4th Cir 1953).
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this rule to relational torts is difficult to accept.2 Conduct that results
in injury to a married person may directly interfere with protected in-
terests of two parties: first, the victim's interest in bodily security, and
second, the consortium interest of the spouse. The death of the party
suffering bodily injury should not bar recovery to the spouse who actually
suffers an independent wrong.43 There are numerous examples where
a single tortious act gives rise to several independent causes of action, e.g.,
slandering two parties or negligently injuring a car load of people. In
the latter case the death of one of the injured persons does not preclude
recovery by the others. Each is entitled to seek redress for their inde-
pendent damages. The rights of consortium should be treated the same
way.
While Wrongful Death Acts provide limited compensation for a
surviving spouse,44 the recovery is not to be confused with that recovery
in an independent action for consortium loss. The Acts allow certain
named dependents recovery in actions that could have been maintained by
the deceased had he lived. These acts were not intended to bar independ-
ent actions that may have accrued simultaneously. In addition, these
statutes are inadequate as a substitute for consortium recovery because
they are limited to pecuniary loss and do not contemplate recovery for
sentimental loss." It is illogical to diminish a tortfeasor's liability for
sentimental injury where he successfully kills instead of merely injuring
the spouse.
Where the injury or death is in the course of employment another
limiting factor is the "exclusive recovery" feature of Workmen's Com-
42. In a recent decision the District of Columbia Court refused to extend the logical
result of the independent rights theory proferred in the Hitaffer case. The court ad-
mitted: "While the loss [of consortium] is just as great, in fact, greater in the case of
death than, perhaps, in the case of an injury not resulting in death, the fact remains that
we are confronted with the rule that in case of death there can be no recovery by the
surviving spouse except for pecuniary losses." Brown v. Curtin and Johnson, Inc., 117
F. Supp. 830, 831 (D.C. 1954).
43. In an action for loss of consortium, recovery is limited to the loss accruing be-
tween the time of injury and the death of the spouse. Long v. Morrison, 14 Ind. 595, 597
(1860) ; Burk v. Anderson, 232 Ind. 77, 109 N.E.2d 407 (1952) ; Graham v. Central of
Georgia Ry., 217 Ala. 658, 117 So. 286 (1928).
44. Those statutes patterned after "Lord Campbell's Act" create a new cause of
action for the benefit of certain named beneficiaries. The purpose of this type of provi-
sion is to compensate these persons for the actual pecuniary loss, up to a specified limit,
suffered because of the wrongful death of the decedent. Northern Ind. Power Co. v.
West, 218 Ind. 321, 32 N.E.2d 713 (1941) ; Lindley v. Sink, 218 Ind. 1, 30 N.E.2d 456
(1940).
A few statutes allow recovery to the estate for the personal injury to the decedent.
Brown v. Perry, 104 Vt. 66, 156 Atl. 910 (1931). See Note, 15 Mo. L. REv. 315 (1950).
45. See supra notes 40, 42.
NOTES
pensation Acts. 6 The acts are designed to replace the common law tort
action with statutorily fixed payments for personal injuries or death
arisng out of and in the course of employment. 7 The employee or his
dependents are assured speedy compensation irrespective of the employer's
fault, and the employer in return is freed from any other liability.
8
Whether or not the advantages of Workmen's Compensation Acts out-
weigh the limitation placed upon common law recovery is a policy ques-
tion for determination by the legislature. The plain language of many of
the acts would seem to support the view that the consortium action of the
wife is precluded so far as the employer is concerned, and courts con-
sidering the issue have generally reached this result."
A third limiting factor in an action for loss of consortium, that
plagues all relational tort actions, is the application of the common law
defenses, namely, assumption of risk and contributory fault." Those
cases considering the issue of imputed contributory negligence have
46. The Indiana Act provides: "The rights and remedies herein granted to an em-
ployee subject to this act . . . shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such em-
ployee, his personal representatives, dependents or next of kin, at common law or other-
wise, on account of such injury or death." IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-1206 (Burns 1952).
The impact of the typical Workmen's Compensation Act is to limit recovery to the
pecuniary elements allowed under the Act and to deny recovery for the sentimental loss.
47. Horovitz, Modern Trends in Workmen's Compensation, 21 INn. L.J. 473, 477
(1946).
48. INn. ANN. STAT. § 40-1202 (Burns 1952) ; for a listing of comparative legisla-
tion, see the annotation at this section.
49. In Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950), it is admitted that
literal interpretation of the exclusive recovery section could be construed to bar recovery
by a spouse. However, placing emphasis upon the separate and independent duty of care
to the spouse's interests, the court indicated that if the exclusive recovery provision
barred the spouse's recovery it would lead to absurd consequences. Id. at 819.
Whether a consortium action by a spouse is barred by the "exclusive recovery" fea-
ture is a matter of statutory interpretation. The interpretation in the Hitaffer case not
applying the bar to the consortium action by a spouse presupposes that the Congress
failed to consider consortium interests in proper perspective as an independent cause of
action. However, the issue of consortium rights under the New York Workman's Com-
pensation Law that served as a model for the Longshoremen's and Harbor Worker's
Compensation Act involved in the Hitaffer case (See H.R. REP. No. 1422, 70th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1928)), had been litigated in the Supreme Court of New York prior to the
passage of the Federal Act. Swan v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 129 Misc. 500, 222 N.Y.
Supp. 111 (1927). The decision upheld the exclusive recovery feature of the act over
the claim for loss of consortium by a husband. It might be pointed out that since this
decision in 1927, legislative action has not been taken to correct the interpretation if in
error. For a discussion of the exclusive recovery feature of the New York Act see Note,
36 CORNELL L.Q. 148 (1950).
For a listing of recent authority refusing to follow the Hitaffer interpretation of
the Workmen's Compensation Acts "exclusive recovery" feature, see Ash v. S. S. Mullen,
Inc., 43 Wash.2d 345, 349,.261 P.2d 118, 120 (1953).
50. In an action for loss of consortium the negligence or assumption of risk of the
husband or wife receiving the bodily injury bars recovery in an action for personal in-
jury. This bar has been applied to the action by the spouse who has received simultaneous
injury to consortium from the same tortfeasor. Herko v. Uviller, 114 N.Y.S.2d 618
(1953).
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held it to be a bar to the recovery by a parent or a spouse.51 Struggling
with the relational aspects of the actions the courts have developed such
words as "derivative" 52 to explain the source of action of the spouse and
to reach a preconceived result denying recovery.
The action for loss of consortium has been shown to be independent
of the action for personal injury by the victim." The sentimental ele-
ments of consortium benefiting the husband never belonged to the wife.
These elements could not be the subject, of recovery by the wife in con-
nection with an action for her personal injuries, for they are more nearly
like property of the husband in the wife's possession.54 Contributory
negligence of the wife in this instance should not be a bar to the husband's
recovery anymore than it is where the wife as bailee and driver of the
husband's car, is involved in a negligent collision and is contributorily
negligent.55 Where a defendant negligently injures a wife in this situa-
tion, contributory negligence merely bars her recovery; it does not dis-
sipate the defendant's initial wrong. A wife can be similarly thought of
as a bailee of the husband's consortium interest and his independent claim
should not be barred in the absence of contributory negligence on his part."
It is true that the common law did not grant the wife the same re-
covery in consortium actions granted to the husband. The idea of equal-
ity between husband and wife is a product of the thinking of the last
century and a half. The wife today is the social equal of the husband
51. Chicago & G.E. Ry. v. Harney, 28 Ind. 28 (1867) : "In order to subject one
to liability to a husband for illness or bodily harm done to his wife, all the elements of a
tort action in the wife must exist, including the tortious conduct of the actor, the result-
ing harm to the wife and the latter's freedom from such fault as would bar recovery by
her...." Herko v. Uviller, 114 N.Y.S.2d 618, 619 (1953) ; RESTATEMENT, ToRTs § 693,
Comment c (1938).
See also Fleming, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 14 LA. L. REv. 340, 355 (1954);
Gregory, The Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff's Wife or Child in an Action for
Loss of Services, 2 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 173 (1935) ; Gilmore, Imputed Negligence, 1 Wis.
L. REv. 193 (1921) ; see Note, 42 A.L.R. 717 (1926).
52. One court expressed the theory as follows: "Whenever the plaintiff derives
his cause of action from an injury to a third person, the contributory negligence of such
third person is imputable to him, so as to charge him with the consequences." Pratt Coal
& Iron Co. v. Brawley, 83 Ala. 371, 374, 3 So. 555, 557 (1887). For a discussion of
"derivative" causes of actions see, Gregory, supra note 51, at 182.
53. Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 290 (1896) ; "At common law two actions lie
for personal injuries to married women. . . . One by the husband . . . for the loss of
services, &c; the other, by the husband and wife . . . for the personal injury." Long v.
Morrison, 14 Ind. 595, 597 (1860).
54. See Gregory, supra note 51 at 174.
55. Lee v. Layton, 95 Ind. App. 663, 167 N.E. 540 (1929).
56. Gilmore, supra note 50 at 213; Keeton, Imputed Contributory Negligence, 13
TEx. L. REV. 161, 176 (1935) ; Notes, 24 MICH. L. REv. 592 (1926) ; 80 U. OF PA. L. REv.
1123, 1130 (1932).
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and should enjoy coextensive legal rights."
The marital relation, itself, involves many interests. A good mar-
riage is a definite social and economic advantage to the parties involved
and to society in general. The sentimental elements of consortium in-
volving such things as counsel, society, sexual intercourse, and affection
have an important role in the family organization, and loss of these by
any member invokes a serious disadvantage that should be compensated
in some form."5 The family in our society is a cooperative enterprise
with reciprocal rights and obligations between the members, "9 and present
socio-economic efforts should be directed to promote this basis of our
culture. The courts clearly have a place in fostering this program.
Some values when lost may not easily be compensated in that no
definite money value can be assigned them. The sentimental benefits of
the conjugal relation fall into this category. There is no easy way to
translate such things as lost love and companionship into cash values, and
courts show reluctance to entrust such determinations to the hazards of
excessive verdicts occasiond by the emotions of a sympathetic jury.6"
Similar difficulties are encountered, however, where pain, suffering, and
mental anguish are concerned.
It might be questioned if the granting of increased consortium re-
covery for the husband with similar rights in the wife really fills a need
in society. The present status of the law, tending to disallow the senti-
mental elements whether because of the difficulty of assessment or the
fear of misuse of the remedy, places the largest recovery in the hands of
the spouse of the victim who earned the highest income. Allowing con-
sortium actions would increase recovery independent of the injured in-
dividual's capacity to provide income, and would bolster the security of
a family unit from the misfortune of negligent injury.
57. See Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REv.
177 (1916) ; "The principles of justice also lead us to give the wife an authority equal to
that of the husband. The subordination of the woman to the man in the marriage rela-
tion is the only example remaining among Anglo-Saxon peoples of the subjection of one
individual of full mental powers to another, on account of an accident of birth." THWING,
THE FAIMILY AN HISTORICAL AND SOCIAL STUDY 149 (Revised ed. 1913).
58. "Our approach to the question must be based on a study of the rights and obliga-
tion of all who are parties to a family. The father, the mother, and the children ordinarily
constitute the family. Each is entitled to the society and the companionship of the
others. Within the limits of the others' abilities, each is entitled to the financial aid and
support of the others. . . ." Daily v. Parker, 152 F.2d 174, 175 (7th Cir. 1945).
59. See ,Pound, supra note 57 at 185.
60. "The damages from the loss of the services, society, and companionship of a
wife is not in its nature susceptible of direct proof, but when the facts are shown, the
assessment of compensation must be committed to the sound discretion and judgment of
the trial court or jury." Indianapolis Traction and Terminal Co. v. Menze, 173 Ind. 31,
36, 88 N.E. 929, 930 (1909).
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Insurance can play an important role in alleviating the hardship
imposed by loss of consortium. As the law now stands, to fully protect
his wife's interest each male spouse is required to insure for his own loss
of physical capacity. Because of the longer life expectancy the greater
burden falls upon the young husband during early married life who can
least afford to pay. If consortium interests were uniformly protected,
the insurance burden would be dispersed to all carriers of liability in-
surance.61 A great percentage of this class is business enterprises that
bear the insurance costs as part of operating expenses. Consequently, the
cost is ultimately passed on to the general public.
General recognition of the wife's cause of action for loss of con-
sortium interest due to negligent injury of the husband is desirable in
that the inequality of the present treatment of the wife cannot be justified
either by logic or policy. Present legislative efforts have not adequately
compensated for consortium loss.62 Where the judiciary is unwilling to
extricate itself from this self-imposed inconsistency, the legislature must
be called upon to eliminate the existing inequality and to remove outmoded
bars to recovery. Injuries to the mutual advantages of partners to a
conjugal relation should not be allowed to go without compensation.
61. At present an action by a husband for negligent injury to his wife is subject of
recovery under a tortfeasor's auto insurance.
62. Indiana at one time provided for civil liability for loss of support due to the
sale of intoxicating liquors. This action was an independent right of the wife where her
loss of support was involved but was limited to pecuniary loss. There is doubt whether
this statute is still in effect. For a discussion of the validity of this Act see, the Note on
Civil liability in connection with IND. ANN. STAT. § 12-610 (Burns Supp. 1953).
